[Literature] Johann Gottlieb Fichte: The System of Ethics #11/193

Originally and immediately, the former is, for itself, by no means an object of any

particular new consciousness, but is simply consciousness itself. Only insofar as consciousness is

directed toward something else, something objective, and is posited in opposition thereto, does it itself

become objective in this act ofcounterpositing. As an originally objective manifestation of the substance in question there thus remains only the second of the two [manifestations mentioned above]; namely,

willing, which, moreover, always remains only objectiveand is never itself an act of thinking, but is

always only the manifestation of self-activity [ Selbsttätigkeit] insofar as the latter is thought. – In short, the sole manifestation [of the substantial I] that I originally ascribe to myself is willing. Only under the

[IV, 21] condition that I become conscious of willing do I become conscious of myself.

All this, taken together, is the meaning of the above proposition.

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Proof

Note. This proof has already been conducted in the author’s work on Natural Right (§ 1). 5 Nevertheless,

we will not dispense with it here, but will present it anew, independent of the terms and expressions

employed in the previous version. This is because we are convinced that presenting the same truth at

different times and in different contexts can contribute greatly toward clarifying the insight of both the

author and the reader.

(1) This proof is based, firstly, on theconcept“I.” The meaning of this concept has just been indicated by showing its genesis. That one actually proceeds in the manner indicated when one thinks of oneself,

and that, conversely, such a procedure produces within one nothing other than the thought of oneself:

this is something that each person has to find within himself, and no separate proof can ever be provided

for this claim. (2) The proof is based, secondly, on the necessity that something subjective is originally

posited in opposition tosomething objectivewithin consciousness. In every act of thinking there is

something thought that is not the act of thinking itself; in all consciousness there is something of which

one is conscious that is not consciousness itself. The truth of this assertion is also something that each

person has to find in the self-intuition of his way of proceeding; it cannot be demonstrated to him from

concepts. – Subsequently, of course, one can become conscious of one’s thinking assuch, i.e., as an act

[ Tun]; one can become conscious of oneself while engaged in thinking, and thus turn the latter into an

object. Philosophical genius is the facility and natural tendency to achieve this latter sort of

consciousness, and without such genius no one can grasp the meaning of transcendental philosophy. But

even this is possible only because one tacitly supplements this act of thinking with a substrate that is

merely thought [VI, 22], even if the latter is entirely undetermined and even if it is only the form of an

object in general. For only under this condition does one actually think an act of thinking. (3) This proof

is based, thirdly, on the original character of what is objective: namely, that what is objective exists

independently of

5 See J. G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, ed. Fred Neuhouser and trans. Michael Baur

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [henceforth = FNR], pp. 18–21 ( SWIII: 17–23; GAI/3: 329–334).

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thinking and is hence something real[Reelles], something that is supposed to exist for itself and through itself. Here again, one has to convince oneself of this through inner intuition. Although this relationship

between what is objective and what is subjective is certainly explicated in a Wissenschaftslehre, it is in no way demonstrated by means of the concepts of what is objective and what is subjective, concepts

which themselves become possible only through such observation.

The proof can be conducted as follows: it is the character of the I that the acting subject and that upon

which it acts are one and the same. As we have seen above, this is the case when what is being thought

of is the I. Only insofar as what is thought of is supposed to be the same as what thinks it do I take the

former to be myself.

But the act of thinking is now supposed to be entirely ignored. Since what is thought is identical with the

thinking subject, I myself am indeed the latter.