The Latin American Report # 507

These days, I have been analyzing in depth some aspects related to Cuba and the economic and humanitarian assistance it receives. I have looked at this issue from two perspectives: Cuba's commercial exchange with a country with which, in principle, it should have a very solid relationship beyond rhetoric, such as Nicaragua, and, on the other hand, the levels of assistance that both countries receive from China and Belarus. It is an alternative analysis to the one proposed by an expert on the issue of U.S. sanctions, which started proving a fact that still, unfortunately, needs to be insisted upon: U.S. sanctions are real and exaggeratedly comprehensive, not an invention of the Cuban government. An interesting point in his analysis was the accurate problematization he made of a usual counter-narrative to that fact, which is reduced to expose the existence of a certain level of purchases of U.S. products, generally poultry, on the part of Cuba.

This is a trade that occurs under unfair conditions, without direct credit to the buyer, who must pay in a cash-in-advance mode or look for a third-country banking institution to represent it before the supplier. With these conditions, in all of 2024, imports of U.S. products into Cuba were valued at $586.5 million. Just in March 2025, the U.S. exported more than $1.2 billion worth of goods to Vietnam. But, looking at the case of Nicaragua, in the first quarter of this year, the value of imports of U.S. products is already around 635 million dollars, noting that there, unlike the Cuban case, it is a two-way trade in which the U.S. is in deficit. Only in the first two months of this year, Nicaragua exported products for more than 630 million dollars to the United States. It is here that I introduce another, reverse perspective, where I am interested in seeing how Managua and Havana get along in terms of trade.

For example, discounting Argentina, a country to which Nicaragua, for reasons beyond my knowledge, generally exports an annual volume of goods well below one million dollars, Cuba was one of the countries that lagged the most in the region in the contracting of Nicaraguan products. I am also interested in zooming in on what is being purchased. For example, over 76% of purchases were concentrated in beverages and chemicals, with less than 20% devoted to meat and grains. This, I understand, has to do with the import dynamics of the Cuban private sector, which is not necessarily dedicated to those items that are more urgent to ensure a healthy and nutritious food, but to products with a faster and more effective outlet in the market.

Since February of last year, meat products have not been imported, but beverages have continued consistently. In the case of Cuban exports to Nicaragua, 2016 was the last year in which Nicaragua imported goods for more than 1 million dollars. Interestingly, Cuba and Venezuela are among the few countries, if not the only two, that do not exceed that benchmark in recent years in the entire region. In the Venezuelan case, there is an abrupt cut in trade dynamics as of 2019, which, for your attention, was the year in which Trump began his onslaught against Caracas. As regards Cuba, it is necessary to take into account the decline in—or depletion of—productive and, therefore, export capacity.

Finally, I am interested in how nations like Belarus and China treat Managua and Havana in terms of economic and humanitarian assistance. Given that the country commanded by Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo does not have even 1% of the level of economic sanctions that weigh on the Island, one would assume that this would be reflected in the levels of support. As is well known, to be fair in terms of solidarity is not to give to all equally but in correspondence with needs and circumstances. In this case, I am convinced that Cuba is no longer a country that interests allies and friends alike, although I am not unaware that there is a certain level of support. But there is no other way to explain the great shortage of finances, food, and fuel, to the extent that, as an expert recently said, the country requires charity. In other words, Cuba needs countries such as China or Russia to act as ad hoc IMF and rescue it financially and humanitarily, with few conditions, if any. In the region, Nicaragua could be more decisive if Ortega pushes in that direction.

However, while China donates 100 buses to the Nicaraguan capital, it “helps” Havana to repair 100. In the case of Belarus, it still negotiates financing schemes to boost exports to Cuba, while in the case of Nicaragua, it has just approved a credit of an undisclosed amount to favor the export of machinery. This may have to do, surely, with a better foreign trade management, more strategic, of the Central American country, and also with the risks involved in the Cuban market, but I believe that essentially there is no longer much interest in the symbolism involved in saving Caribbean socialism, so purely mercantile interests prevail. Instead of charging only against Washington, which is correct and fair, we must also enter into a strong analysis of the quantity and quality of the support received from friendly and allied countries, in correspondence with their capacities and comparing what they send and invest in other nations not as needy as Cuba. How do you see it?